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PROPERTY TAX CLASSIFICATION AND




The North Carolina Constitution permits legislative classification of
property for taxation but requires uniformity within classes.1 It exempts
from taxation property owned by the state and by municipal corpora-
tions ;2 and it gives the General Assembly discretionary power to grant
enumerated exemptions of the sort commonly found in state constitu-
tions.3 The 1957 Commission to Study the Revenue Structure of the
State, conscious of the increasing demands for revenue and the dangers
of reducing the property tax base, wrestled with two problems within
this constitutional framework: Does the power to classify include the
power to exclude from the tax base property not entitled to exemption?
May the General Assembly delegate to local units of government the
power to classify and exempt ?4 This paper summarizes the research on
these problems presented to the Commission.5
When collected, any tax on property amounts to a "taking of a part
of the taxpayer's wealth, represented by the property he owns, for the
needs of government." 6  In defining "property" for tax purposes the
North Carolina Supreme Court has said that it "extends to every aspect
of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such upon which it is
practicable to place a money value."7 Traditionally, there are two kinds
of property taxes: (1) A general property tax, that is, "a tax on all
* Professor of Public Law and Government and Assistant Director, Institute of
Government.
IN.C. CONST. art. 5, § 3 (1935).2Id. art. 5, § 5 (1935).
' "The General Assembly may exempt cemeteries and property held for edu-
cational, scientific, literary, charitable or religious purposes; also wearing apparel,
arms for muster, household and kitchen furniture, the mechanical and agricultural
implements of mechanics and farmers, libraries, and scientific instruments, or any
other personal property, to a value not exceeding three hundred dollars. The
General Assembly may exempt from taxation not exceeding one thousand dollars($1,000.00) in value of property held and-used as the place of residence of the
owner." Ibid.
'TAX STUDY COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, REPORT (1958).
'The research was presented to the Commission in a series of oral and written
reports and finally summarized in LEWIS, BAsIc LEGAL PROBLEMS IN THE TAXA-
TIoN OF PROPERTY (1958).
'Bemis Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Graham County, 214 N.C. 167, 170, 198 S.E.
843, 844 (1938)."
'
t Hildebrand v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 219 N.C. 402, 408, 14 S.E.2d
252, 256 (1941).
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property regardless of its nature, at a uniform rate throughout the
jurisdiction imposing the tax."8 (2) A classified property tax, that is, a
tax on property segregated into groups or types through application of
different "effective tax rates"9 to the various classes.10
Until 1936 the North Carolina Constitution required uniform
imposition of a tax on all property not specifically exempted, and it also
required full value assessment of the property taxed-that is, a general
property tax.1 Since 1936 the constitution has authorized classifica-
tion,12 leaving the General Assembly free to define classes and to fix the
rates and assessment standards to be applied to each taxed class.18
At the present time North Carolina levies no general property tax
as a state; it does, however, levy in behalf of the counties and municipali-
ties a tax or set of taxes on selected items of intangible personal
property.14 In addition, the General Assembly empowers and requires
counties, cities, towns, and special districts to impose taxes within their
jurisdictions on all non-exempt property that has not been classified and
taxed under the Intangibles Tax by the state.', These taxes on
property are the principal source of revenue for all local units of
government.' 6
8 LELAND, THE CLASSI'IED PROPERTY TAX IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1928).
' In theory a property owner is concerned not so much with the rate of tax
or the standard of assessment chosen as he is with the amount of money he will
have to pay in tax. Thus, for example, if the actual market value of a tract of
land is $10,000 the owner is not especially concerned with whether it is assessed
at 75%1 of market value and taxed at $1.33Y per $100 of valuation or assessed at
50% of market value and taxed at $2 per $100 of valuation. The tax due will be
100 in either event. From the owner's point of view the effective rate is $1 per
100 of valuation or 1% of the true value of the property. "By 'effective rate is
meant the per cent which the amount of the tax paid is to the true value of the
property." LELAND, op. cit. .supra note 8, at 41.10 Ibid.
I" "Laws shall be passed taxing, by a uniform rule, all moneys, credits, in-
vestments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock companies or otherwise; and, also, all real
and personal property according to its true value in money.... ." N.C. CONsT. art.
5, § 3 (1924). "All taxes levied by any county, city, town, or township shall be
uniform and ad valorem upon all property in the same, except property exempted
by this Constitution." Id. art. 7, § 9 (1868).
"At the general election in 1936 the people approved amendments repealing
N.C. CONST. art 7, § 9 (1868), quoted in note 11, and re-writing art. 5, § 3 (1924).
The re-written section is quoted in the text infra, page 118.
" It should also be noted that under the amended constitution the standard used
in assessing property need not be "full value' or "market value" so long as it is
proportional or equal in its treatment of the property in the class.
1" Shares of stock; bonds, notes, and other evidences of debt; accounts receivable;
money on hand; money on deposit; money left with insurance companies. N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 105-199 to -205 (Supp. 1957).
N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 105-281, -282, -294, -296 to -299, -303 (Supp. 1957).
1"The property tax is the major source of revenue of the counties and munici-
palities in North Carolina and the only source of tax revenue of schools and other
special districts. . . The property tax (including the State-collected intangible
personal property tax) provided 90 per cent of all local tax revenue, including the
local portion of shared State taxes, during the 1956-57 fiscal year. The local
property tax provided 96 per cent of the revenue from taxes levied by the local
governments themselves.... ." TAX STUDY COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NORTH




Before amendment in 1936, the two pertinent provisions of the
North Carolina Constitution were phrased in mandatory terms:
Laws shall be passed taxing, by a uniform rule .... all real and
personal property .... 17
All taxes levied by any county, city, town, or township shall be
uniform and ad valorem upon all property in the same, except
property exempted by this Constitution.'
At a time when these provisions were in effect, the court, in a case
questioning the right of a town to tax intangibles, took the position that
"when the taxing power is exercised for a public purpose, the Constitu-
tion, and not the Legislature, declares what property shall be taxed...."19
Having reached this conclusion the court held that the wording of the
quoted sections required taxation of "all real and personal property"--
including intangibles. 20 Thus, except as the constitution itself provided
for exemptions by an equally potent provision, all real property and
tangible and intangible personal property remained subject to mandatory
taxation until the amendments of 1936.
In the North Carolina statutes enacted during the life of the former
constitutional language there is every indication that-with respect to
county and municipal property taxes-the General Assembly accepted
the judicial interpretation of necessary tax coverage. 21 It should be
noted, however, that the General Assembly did not adhere to the notion
that the constitution required the state itself to tax all property for state
revenue purposes. On the contrary, in 1921 the state stopped taxing
property as a means of raising revenue for state operations.2 2 In the
1930's the state returned to the property tax for a brief period and im-
posed a tax of 15l on the $100 of valuation of property in support of the
" N.C. CoNsT. art. 5, § 3 (1924).
1
,Id. art. 7, § 9 (1868).
19 Redmond v. Commissioners, 106 N.C. 122, 128, 10 S.E. 845, 847 (1890).
In the context in which the court made this decision, it was plain that it was
intended to apply to state and county taxation as .well as municipal.
" Redmond v. Commissioners, supra note 19. See also Smith v. Wilkins, 164
N.C. 136, 140, 80 S.E. 168, 170 (1913) (dictum). The view of the North Carolina
Supreme Court was not universally accepted in other states. 51 Am. JUL., Taxatiol;
§ 154 (1957).
21 The Machinery Act of 1935, for example, declared that, "All property, real
and personal, within the jurisdiction of the state, not especially exempted, shall
be subject to taxation." N.C. Pub. Laws 1935, c. 417, § 300. Personal property
was defined to include both tangibles and intangibles. Id. § 305. The term
"intangible property" was defined to mean "patents, copyrights, secret processes
and formulae, good-will, trade-marks, trade-brands, franchises, stocks, bonds, notes,
evidences of debt, bills and accounts receivable, and other like property." Id., §
2(10). Tangible personalty was defined to cover all personal property not
included in the definition of intangibles. Id., § 2(11). And "real property" was
given a standard comprehensive definition. Id., § 2(30).
" N.C. Pub. Laws 1921, c. 34, § 3.
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public school system. 23 But upon abandonment of that levy, local units
of government were left with the entire property tax field. Until 1937
the counties and municipalities imposed their tax rates on assessments-
of both tangible and intangible personal property as well as real estate-
determined much as they are today.
After amendment in 1936 the Constitution of North Carolina was left
with a single directive with respect to property taxation: "Taxes on
property shall be uniform as to each class of property taxed." 24  This
was a significant change from the former phrasing: "Laws shall be
passed taxing, by a uniform rule .. . all real and personal property
according to its true value in money .... ,,25 Use of the words "each
class of property taxed" in the amended version seems to suggest that
the explicit meaning is, "If a class of property is taxed the tax applied
to that class must be applied uniformly." If such an interpretation is
adopted the legislature is left free to decide whether or not it will
include a given class of property in the tax base or leave it untaxed.
Such a view, however, would ignore the constitutional section limiting
the General Assembly's power to grant exemption from taxation or, at
least, subordinate it to the classification section.
EXEMPTIONS
The provision of the North Carolina Constitution dealing with
exemption of property from taxation 26 remains much as it was when
inserted in 1868. In specific terms it exempts all property belonging
to the state and to municipal corporations2 7 and grants to the General
Assembly power to exempt property held for the usually exempting
uses, 28 as well as homesteads to a value of $1,0002" and any personal
property to a value of $300.30
2" N.C. Pub. Laws 1931, c. 427, § 492.
' N.C. CoNsr. art. 5, § 3 (1935).
" N.C. CoN'sT, art. 5 § 3 (1924). 28Id. art. 5, § 5 (1935).
" The constitutional exemption of state property is reiterated in the Machinery
Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-271 to -397, especially -296(1) and -297(1) (Supp.
1957), and then, with judicial sanction, the'legislature limits the application of the
language with respect to municipal property to that used for public or governmental
purposes. Warrenton v. Warren County, 215 N.C. 342, 2 S.E.2d 463 (1939).
Whether the courts would uphold a similar limitation on the constitutional exemp-
tion of state-owned property is not settled. See Weaverville v. Hobbs, 212 N.C.
684, 689, 194 S.E. 860, 864 (1937) (especially the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice
Stacy and Justice Clarkson), Warrenton v. Warren County, supra at 349, 2 S.E.2d
at 467 (concurring opinion of Justice Clarkson), and Coates, The Battle of
Exemptions, 19 N.C.L. Rxv. 154, 171 (1941).
" "The General Assembly may exempt cemeteries and property held for
educational, scientific, literary, charitable or religious purposes. .. "N.C. CoNS'r.
art 5, §5 (1935).
29 ". . The General Assembly may exempt from taxation not exceeding one
thousand dollars ($1,000.00) in value of property held and used as the place of
residence of the owner." Ibid.
'0 "The General Assembly may exempt .. . wearing apparel, arms for muster,
household and kitchen furniture, the mechanical and agricultural implements of
[Vol. 37
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The General Assembly has exercised its exemption powers in two
major acts of general application-the Machinery Act3 l and the In-
tangibles Tax article of the Revenue ActA--and in a number of local
or special acts as well as in a few other general acts. In general, the
provisions of the two major state-wide acts indicate that the legislature
has followed the exemption scheme outlined in the constitution,3 3 not
hesitating, however, to exercise less than all of its exemption authority
in specific instances. 34  The only permissive exemption power the Gen-
eral Assembly has completely refrained from exercising is that con-
cerning homesteads 5
As already mentioned, in addition to the state-wide statutes in which
the legislature has seen fit to make use of some of its power to grant
exemptions, there have been instances in which it has exercised that
power on a local basis. In 1957, for example, the General Assembly
passed a bill declaring a certain church in Richmond County to be a
religious organization and thereby exempt from property taxes.3 6
A more troublesome problem is presented by the number of instances
in which the legislature-both state-wide and on a local basis-has
granted exemption to property not exemptible under the terms of the
constitutional grant.3 7 (In a few cases the General Assembly has paid
lip service to the constitutional enumeration by "declaring" certain
properties to be "held for" purposes which would entitle them to exemp-
mechanics and farmers, libraries, and scientific instruments, or any other personal
property, to a value not exceeding three hundred dollars.... ." Ibid.
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-271 to -397 (Supp. 1957) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1939, c.
310].
3 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-198 to -217 (Supp. 1957).
'B Often the statutory language echoes the constitution. For example, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-297(8) (Supp. 1957) grants exemption to, "Wearing apparel,
household and kitchen furniture, the mechanical and agricultural instruments of
farmers and mechanics, libraries and scientific instruments, provisions and livestock,
not exceeding the total value of three hundred dollars ($300.00). . . ." The ex-
emption section of the Intangibles Tax is found in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-212
(Supp. 1957).
" It should be noted, for example, that property "held" for the various ex-
empting uses is granted exemption only if it is held by or for institutions or
agencies which are themselves "educational, scientific, literary, charitable or
religious." If held by or for others the property remains taxable. "Any organiza-
tion claiming exemption, therefore, must bring itself within the statutory type as
well as within the constitutional purpose." Coates, supra note 27, at 181.
"While this statement is accurate in a strict sense, it should be noted that in
1957 the General Assembly empowered the commissioners of Bertie County to call
a referendum on whether the $1,000 homestead tax exemption should apply in
that county. Interestingly, if the vote should favor the exemption the act provides
that the exemption is to terminate if the state should ever levy a tax on property.
N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 1330.
"N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 748. The act does not explain the necessity for this
special handling, but it may be that the problem suggested supra, note 34, may have
been in some way involved.
"'Thirty-one examples of state-wide exemptions of this kind and thirteen
examples of local exemptions of this kind are listed in Lvzws, op. cit. spra,
note 5, at 21-25.
19591
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tion,8 8 but such declarations are not conclusive on the courts.) 89 And
at the administrative level, apart from constitutional or statutory
authorization, there are well-documented cases of informal exemption
on a local basis. 40 If invalid under the exemption section of the con-
stitution, can these legislative and administrative exemptions be upheld
as proper exclusions from the tax base under the classification power?
CLASSIFICATION
Classification means selection and definition of groups or types of
property before taxation; and to the legislature belongs the right and
duty of making the selection and defining the classes. Courts will not
strike down legislative classifications if they can be upheld on any
reasonable grounds:
In the nature of things, narrow distinctions are sometimes in-
voked, and if founded on a rational basis and reasonably related
to the object of the legislation, the courts will not say that a
different result should have been reached or that the differentiation
is arbitrary. . . . 'Such differences need not be great.' . . .
However, 'mere difference is not enough.'... It must be relevant
or pertinent as well as rational.4'
As early as 1913 an attempt was made to authorize the General
Assembly to classify all property for tax purposes. That effort failed,
and the idea was again advanced-in more limited form-in 1927.
That year the legislature submitted to the people a constitutional amend-
" For example, N.C. Gnw. STAT. § 57-14 (Supp. 1957) ; N.C. Sess. Laws 1955,
c. 589; and N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 661.
"In an allied field the General Assembly passed an act characterizing a municipal
recreation system as "a governmental function and a necessary expense as defined
by Article VII, section 7, of the Constitution of North Carolina." When the
issue was presented to the North Carolina Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Seawell
wrote: "Whatever enthusiasms may be engendered or fostered in the name of
progress, they can be indulged only within the limitation . . . expressed [in the
Constitution] and cannot be expanded beyond it either by legislative action or byjudicial construction, provided these co-ordinate branches of the Government act
within the terms of the political and official trusts committed to them. Of the two,
the judiciary has the last say. While the legislative construction of the Constitution
is entitled to great weight, it is not binding upon the Court. ... The ultimate
decision as to what constitutes a necessary expense is always for the courts."
Purser v. Ledbetter, 227 NI.C. 1, 4, 40 S.E.2d 702, 705 (1946). To the same effect,
but less explicitly, see Nash v. Tarboro, 227 N.C. 283, 42 S.E.2d 209 (1947),
Rhodes v. Asheville, 230 N.C. 134, 52 S.E.2d 371 (1949), and Britt v. Wilmington,
236 N.C. 446, 73 S.E.2d 289 (1952).
"In preparing its report to the General Assembly of 1959 the Tax Study
Commission submitted to the county tax supervisors of the state a questionnaire
which developed evidence, for illustrative purposes, of eight cases of such exemption.
Lzwis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 26.
"I Leonard v. Maxwell, 216 N.C. 89, 96, 3 S.E.2d 316, 322 (1939). This was a
sales tax case. In the absence of decisions on property tax classifications in
North Carolina it is necessary to refer to this decision and to language in occu-
pational and privilege license tax cases: Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Shaw,
232 N.C. 307, 59 S.E.2d 819 (1950) ; Roach v. Durham, 204 N.C. 587, 169 S.E. 149(1933).
[Vol. 37
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ment designed to permit classification of intangibles, then usually called
"solvent credits. ' 42  When this amendment failed the State Tax Com-
mission promptly suggested another which it described as "broader in
scope," one "which would vest in the sound discretion of the General As-
sembly the authority to adopt at any time such reasonable classification of
any particular class of property as it may find to be just and in the interest
of a complete and orderly enforcement and administration of the tax
laws. .... -43 The precise language proposed by the Tax Commission
was remarkably direct:
Taxes shall be uniform upon each class of property within the
jurisdiction levying the tax.4 4
The proposal actually submitted to the electorate by the 1929 General
Assembly, although considerably more detailed, was much less explicit.45
Again the people rejected the change. In 1933 the movement for a new
constitution supplanted the single issue of classification, but it is signifi-
cant that the taxation article in the draft constitution eliminated the
requirement of uniformity. This, it was assumed, left the General
Assembly free to classify property at will. 46 Since the proposed constitu-
" The text of the change proposed in 1913 read as follows: "The General
Assembly may, consistent with natural justice and equity, classify subjects of
taxation; and all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property within
the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax: Provided, that no income
shall be taxed when the property from which the income is derived is taxed; and,
consistent with natural justice and equity, the General Assembly may separate
subjects of taxation for State and local purposes." N.C. Pub. Laws, Ex. Sess. 1913,
c. 81, § I(VII). The text of N.C. CONsT. art. 5, § 3, as the 1927 amendment
proposed would have been rewritten as follows: "Laws shall be passed taxing
all real and personal property, including moneys, bonds, notes, investments in stock,
and all other choses in action, according to their true value in money. The rate of
taxation on real property and tangible personal property shall be uniform within
the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, but intangible personal
property may be classified by the General Assembly, which shall prescribe a uniform
rate of tax throughout the State for each class. . . " N.C. Pub. Laws 1927, c. 216.
"1 THE (N.C.) TAX CoMMIssIoN, REPORT 37 (1928). The Commission was
interested in the classification of forest lands as well as intangibles. Id. at 41.
" Ibid.
"5 N.C. Pub. Laws 1929, c. 108. The text proposed was as follows: "Taxation
shall be ad valorem and uniform as to each class of property. Laws shall be passed
taxing, by a rule that is uniform as to each class of property, all moneys, credits,
investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock companies, or otherwise; and, also all real
and personal property according to its true value in money. The General Assembly
may adopt such classification of real property and personal property as it may find
to be reasonable. .. "
10 "It will permit the legislature to encourage, by proper adaptation of the
tax system, such socially desirable objectives as more wide-spread home ownership,
the development of forestry and the conservation of natural resources. It will
permit the legislature to classify property according to its ability to pay, and such
a classification will result in placing on the tax books much property which taxpayers
now refuse to list. This increase in the value of property listed will offset any
decrease in tax revenues created by lowering tax rates on some types of property."
GARDNER, THE PROPOSED CoNsTiTunoN FOR NORTH CAROLINA 59 (1934). The
proposed constitution retained the exemption section. Id. at 50. Dean Henry
Brandis wrote the comment on art. 5 in GARDNER, op. cit. supra. See 36 N.C.L.
REv. 298, n. 2 (1958).
1959]
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tion was never submitted to a vote there is no way of knowing how the
people would have received this new departure. It was not until the
present language of the constitution was approved at the general elec-
tion of 1936 that the General Assembly was given power to classify
property for tax purposes.
A question on which the North Carolina Supreme Court has not been
called upon to express an opinion is whether the General Assembly must
state specifically what it is doing when it exercises its classification
power or whether it may exercise the power indirectly and without ex-
planation. Allied issues, however, have brought forth statements from the
court that suggest what its answer would be.47 Although principles of
good statutory draftsmanship suggest that a classification statute should
recite the fact that a classification is being made, it is unlikely that the
courts would invalidate a proper classification simply because the act
failed to meet this formality. This may have a bearing on the validity of
some of the questioned exemption statutes.
Once North Carolina took care of the pressing problem of intangible
property taxation in 1937, the General Assembly tended not to make
explicit use of its classification power. Part of the problem today arises
from a general unfamiliarity with this power.
UNIFORMITY
Property taxes must be administered under a set of standards or
measurements, and these are usually established by constitution or statute.
The constitutional standard applicable in North Carolina is uniformity of
taxation within classes of property: "Taxes on property shall be uniform
as to each class of property taxed."
As a constitutional principle, uniformity demands equality of treat-
ment and equity in result.48  In property taxation it governs assessment
standards as well as rates of taxation, but, constitutionally speaking, it
does not require any one assessment standard; it merely requires use of
the same measurement for all property within a given class.49 The
'
7 In a privilege license tax case, for example, the court said: "The legislature
is not required to preamble or label its classifications. . . . It is sufficient if the
court, upon review, may find them supported by justifiable reasoning." Snyder v.
Maxwell, 217 N.C. 617, 620, 9 S.E.2d 19, 21 (1940). The court has also said that
when the legislature exercises its "police power" it does not have to state specifically
that it is doing so; the courts will determine the exercise by the effect of the act.
Roach v. Durham, 204 N.C. 587, 591, 169 S.E. 149, 151 (1933). And in a sales
tax case appeared the following language: "When these subjects are segregated by
descriptions or definitions with reasonable clearness-the classification reasonable
and the distinctions made not arbitrary or capricious-the imposition of the tax
is not assailable." Henderson v. Gill, 229 N.C. 313, 317, 49 S E 2d 754 757 (1948).
"Atlantic & N.C. R.R. v. New Bern, 147 N.C. 165, 167, 60 S.E. 925 926 (1908).
Cf. State v. Danenberg, 151 N.C. 718, 720, 66 S.E. 301, 302 (1909), citing Gatlin v.
Tarboro, 78 N.C. 119, 121-22 (1878). See also Leonard v. Maxwell, 216 N.C. 89,
3 S.E.2d 316 (1939).
" 51 Am. JuR., Taxation § 162 (1957).
[Vol. 37
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choice of assessment standard or base is within legislative discretion so
long as the resulting tax valuations are uniform.
Choosing to use this freedom sparingly, the General Assembly has,
in general, adhered to the traditional requirement that all property be
valued or assessed for taxation at its true or full value in money." In
some instances, especially with respect to classified intangibles, the legis-
lature has, however, authorized credits against full value before the tax
rate is applied.51
Rates of taxation for classified intangibles are uniform throughout the
state,5 2 but local rates are permitted to vary from unit to unit so long as
they are applied uniformly within a given taxing unit. 3 In rare in-
stances the legislature has permitted local taxing units to impose on
certain classes of property, rates different from those applied to other
property in the unit.54
The setting of uniform tax rates within local taxing jurisdictions
has not been a matter of concern in North Carolina, but the setting of
assessment standards has become a matter of first importance. When
the statute speaks of market value as the required assessment base55 it
is understood that current market value is implied. It is generally
known, however, that the precision with which this standard is applied
varies widely from taxing unit to taxing unit. It is slightly less well
known that application of the standard varies among classes of property
within individual taxing units.58 One major variation appears with
respect to the concept of what is current value. Rather than appraise
at 100% of market value for the year in which an assessment is made,
some counties select what they consider a "normal" or "average" year
in the past and try to value property in terms of prices prevailing during
the base year.57 A second variation appears with respect to the concept
of inarket value as the assessment standard. Even in those counties in
which market value is used in making appraisals it is not used as the
base against which tax rates are applied. It is common practice to
adopt some percentage of the appraised market value and use that re-
duced figure as the assessed valuation.58
Most counties use a different percentage of market value in assessing
personal property from that used in assessing realty, commonly varying
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-294, -358, -365, -199, -200, -204, -205 (Supp. 1957).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-298(b), -298(c), -201 to -203 (Supp. 1957).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-199 to -205 (Supp. 1957).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-294. See Puitt v. Commissioners, 94 N.C. 709 (1886).
8'For example, "agricultural products in storage," as defined in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-294.1 (Supp. 1957), and "peanuts in the year following the year in
which grown," as defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-294.2 (Supp. 1957).
"
5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-294 (Supp. 1957).58TAx STUDY CommissioN, REPoRT 6-12 (1958).7Id. at 6-7. See also, LEwis, PREPARATION FoR REVALUATION 29 (1956).
58 LEWIS, op. cit. supra note 57, at 30.
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the percentage among types of personalty.59 In assessing the property
of railroads and public service companies the State Board of Assessment
is faced with having to balance three considerations-the acknowledged
assessment practices used by the counties for all other properties, the
statutory standard of true market value, and the constitutional require-
ment of uniformity. Thus, once having determined total value, the
State Board reduces that figure by a percentage calculated to equalize
the utility's assessment with the tax values on property assessed locally.60
Recognizing that uniformity is the explicitly prescribed standard for
taxation of property within classes, it is pertinent to consider the broader
implications of uniformity as a constitutional principle or concept in
taxation. The issue can be brought into focus by examining two sections
that have been inserted in the Machinery Act since its permanent enact-
ment in 1939. The first, under the title "Agricultural products in
storage," was inserted in 1947 and reads as follows:
If the board of county commissioners of any county shall de-
termine as a fact that any agricultural product is held in said
county by any manufacturer or processor for manufacturing or
processing, which agricultural product is of such nature as cus-
tomarily to require storage and processing for periods of more than
one year in order to age or condition such product for manu-
facture, and if such determination is entered on the minutes of
such board on or before March 31st in any year, such agricultural
product shall be taxed in that year uniformly as a class at sixty
per cent (60%) of the rate levied for all purposes upon real estate
and other tangible personal property by or for said county and/or
the city, town, or special district in which such agricultural prod-
ucts are listed for taxation.61 (Emphasis added.)
By indirection, if not by specific statement, this statute singles out
for special treatment a certain described kind of property and it uses the
language of classification. But does the statute constitute a classification
by the General Assembly, or does it merely delegate to the boards of
county commissioners authority to make this classification?62 One
commentator has pointed out that the "double use of 'if' . . . points in
the direction of" leaving it discretionary with the commissioners whether
to put the classification into effect, "particularly its second use in con-
nection with the making of the finding by the date specified."63  If it is
assumed that each board is left to its own discretion, "Can there ... be
" TAx STUDY CommissioN, REPORT 7-9 (1958).
00 LEwis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 34-35.
"1 N.C. Sess. Laws 1947, c. 1026, codified as N.C. GEr. STAT. § 105-294.1
(Supp. 1957).
"' It may be noted that the title of the act read as follows:"... To Amend the
Machinery Act for the Purpose of Classifying Certain Agricultural Products...
Ibid.
"825 N.C.L R v. 464-65 (1947).
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a classification of property within a single county which does not obtain
elsewhere?"64 This was an issue left open by the commentator and
which must be left open here until some attention has been paid to the
problems of state policy and delegation of legislative powers.
In 1955 the second of the two sections under scrutiny was enacted
under the title, "Peanuts; year following year in which grown":
Peanuts shall be taxed uniformly as a class in the year following
the year in which such peanuts are grown at not less than twenty
per cent (20%) nor more than sixty per cent (60%) of the rate
levied for all purposes upon real estate and other tangible personal
property by or for said county and the city, town, or special dis-
trict, if any, in which such peanuts are listed for taxation. The
amount of the per cent of the tax rate to be applicable to such pea-
nuts as herein provided shall be fixed each year for the succeeding
year by the county board of commissioners not later than the time
of the first September meeting of said board. 5 (Emphasis added.)
In this statute the legislature defines the class, and that class has no
geographic limitations other than the boundaries of the state. The
commissioners of a given county, unlike the situation in the first section
discussed, are allowed no discretion with respect to classifying or adopt-
ing the legislative classification.
In neither statute can the exercise of discretion by the board of
county commissioners affect the tax base either by exemption or by
assessment. It can affect only the rates of tax imposed within the local
taxing jurisdiction against a class of property-one which, under the
first of these sections, it is assumed, is classified for local purposes by
the commissioners, and which, under the second section, is classified for
state-wide purposes by the legislature itself.
It is the first of these sections that raises the basic questions: Does
the General Assembly have authority to provide for the local taxation
of selected types of property at different levels of assessment and at
different percentages of local rates in different taxing units? If so,
may the legislature delegate the right to exercise that power to the local
units? As a matter of policy, is the right to make such a delegation
desirable?
If, with respect to a particular local taxing unit, the legislature itself
defines a class of property and provides for its assessment or taxation
for local purposes at levels different from other property in that unit,
it is unlikely that the courts would find any violation of the uniformity
rule, for there would be no lack of uniformity within the taxing jurisdic-
tion and the class would have been defined by the General Assembly. In
such a situation, for purposes of illustration, assume that the legislature
"Ibid.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-294.2 (Supp. 1957).
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imposes a state-wide tax on all property to raise revenue for state pur-
poses. With respect to this state levy all property in the state (other
than classified intangibles) would fall in the same class. That being
true, as applied to the property specially classified for the particular local
taxing unit already referred to, the state tax would be uniform. Such
also would be the case if the unit's classification had been made by local
officials pursuant to a delegation of power from the General Assembly.
(The propriety of such a delegation is discussed at a later point.) But
what if there were no state-wide tax on property in general? The
courts have not been asked whether the constitutional standard of uni-
formity is strong enough in such a situation to require state-wide
uniformity in local assessment ratios and in percentages of local rates
of taxation applicable to property in a given class regardless of the taxing
unit in which located. For the Tax Study Commission appointed in
1957 the policy issue was whether the uniformity principle should be
accorded that much strength.
If for present purposes it is assumed that the General Assembly is
free to delegate the power to classify, and that local exercise of the power
will be upheld so long as no state tax on property is involved, the field
is open for competition among counties. A given county may classify in
order to put itself in a better position to retain or secure a given class of
property or property-owner. Other counties will soon feel they must
meet the challenge and "under tax" the first county. Examples of this
sort of competition are already in evidence.66 Should the constitutional
statement of the uniformity standard be spelled out to clarify the state's
policy?
EXCLUSIONS FROm TAXATION
If the rule of uniformity is applicable simply within individual local
taxing units rather than state-wide, and if the only restraint on the
legislature's classification power is the mild judicial admonition for de-
fining classes, skilled draftsmen would have little difficulty in producing
legislation offering the widest variety of assessment and rate patterns
among the counties and municipalities. Nor would they have difficulty
in reducing the tax base throughout the state or in any given local
jurisdiction.67
But, as already observed, the uniformity and classification principles
do not stand alone. From its adoption, the present North Carolina
66N.C. Sess. Laws 1949, cc. 634, 1106; N.C. Sess. Laws 1951, c. 633; N.C.
Sess. Laws 1955, c. 192.
17 Four methods would be available: (1) Devise rules for the assessment of
a given class or set of classes calculated to insure that little or no taxable value is
obtained. (2) Fix rates so low for a given class or classes as to effect practical
exemption. (3) Grant specific exemption. (4) List and define the classes of
property to be taxed, thereby securing automatic exemption for classes -not in-
cluded in the list.
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Constitution has fixed stringent limitations on the General Assembly's
power to grant exemptions from taxation; these limitations are as old
as the uniformity rule, and they were left intact when the classification
power was adopted.6 8 In plain language the constitution enumerates the
specific categories of property the General Assembly is permitted to
exempt.6 9 In a property tax case, would the North Carolina Supreme
Court be willing to say-as it did in a sales tax case--"The power to
classify ex necessitate carries with it the discretion to select the subjects
of taxation and to grant exemptions" ?7o Or would the court observe
that the constitution said nothing about sales taxes, much less about
the legislature's power to exclude and exempt from such a tax, while
the constitution has always had something to say about the legislature's
power to exempt from the property tax?
So long as the North Carolina Constitution required the imposition
of a general property tax it was correct to say that all property (except
that owned by the state and municipal corporations) was subjected to
the tax unless, in the exercise of a limited constitutional exemption
power, the General Assembly granted exemption. Thus, until 1936 the
North Carolina law was embodied in the maxim, "Taxation is the rule,
exemption the exception."
But adoption of the classification amendment in 1936 worked a change
in North Carolina's constitutional theory. The general property tax
mandate was replaced by a grant of power to the legislature to establish
a classified property tax. This pronounced change in theory is dis-
closed by the constitution's amended language; the economic and political
circumstances attendant upon the amendment's adoption support the
construction. 71
Whether or not it was the primary motive for North Carolina's
1936 change, it is a recognized attribute of a classified property tax that
the legislature is left free to select the classes to be taxed.72 In selecting
some classes for taxation it may elect not to select others; the power to
G See discussion of exemptions supra, page 118.
N.C. CONsT. art. 5, § 5 (1935), quoted supra note 3.7oLeonard v. Maxwell, 216 N.C. 89, 96, 3 S.E.2d 316, 322 (1939).
71 When the "classification amendment" was adopted the legislature was con-
cerned with bolstering local property tax revenues, not with the theoretical issue
of whether its new right to classify included the right to exclude. The Classifica-
tion Amendment Commission named in 1937 directed its attention to three issues:
(1) exemptions under the $1,000 homestead amendment adopted in 1936; (2) the
classification of forest lands; and (3) the classification of intangibles. In making
its report in 1938 the Commission made plain its belief that "before the General
Assembly of this state attempts to use its classification power for any purpose not
connected with these three," it should "call upon some state agency, temporary or
permanent, for preliminary study of the proposals." NORTH CAROLINA CLASSIFICA-
TIOI AMENDMENT COMMISSION, REPORT 11 (1938). And this has never been done.
Once the General Assembly took care of the pressing problem of intangible property
taxation, it tended to drop consideration of further use of its classification power.
2 LELAND, op. cit. supra note 8, at 404-05.
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choose implies the power to exclude. In economic fact, apart from legal
or language distinctions, failure to tax is equivalent to exemption from
taxation.
Accepted canons for construing constitutional provisions require
that the entire document-all of its sections-be read as if written and
adopted at one time to achieve a unitary plan and purpose. And this
applies to amended sections as well as to those incorporated in the original
instrument. Each provision or section is to be given meaning and treated
as if it had full life and vigor, those unchanged as well as those amended.
But if there is an irreconcilable inconsistency between an amended
provision and one left unchanged the courts will hold that the amended
section, as the latest expression of the people's will, should control.73
Thus, an attempt should be made to construe the exemption and
classification sections of North Carolina's constitution to give full effect
to both. If possible the classification section should not be held to
emasculate the exemption section, and certainly the exemption section
should not be interpreted so as to shackle the legislature's use of its
classification power.
In a given example the legislature might fail to select a certain type
of property for taxation and, by virtue of that exclusion, effect its
exemption. Should the excluded property not fall into one of the types
which the exemption section of the constitution permits the General
Assembly to exempt, the constitutional question will arise. To hold that
the exemption section controls the legislature's selection of property for
exclusion from the tax base would be equivalent to saying that the fol-
lowing mandate-removed from the constitution by amendment in 1936
-was eliminated in letter but not in spirit: "Laws shall be passed
taxing, by a uniform rule .. .all real and personal property. . .."74
Such an interpretation would limit the legislature's classification power
to the right to divide the general mass of property into groups or types
---classes-permitting different rates of taxation and methods of assess-
ment within the classes thus defined. Nevertheless, all property, though
divided into classes, would remain taxable unless the exemption section
of the constitution granted or permitted its exemption.
Admitting that this interpretation has the effect of harmonizing the
two constitutional sections, it plainly subordinates the classification sec-
tion to the exemption section and places strict limits on a primary purpose
of classfication-that is, recognition that the taxing power is one for
legislative discretion, especially in the selection of subjects for taxation.
Ordinarily, as already suggested, if, as here, two provisions of a con-
stitution cannot both be given complete and independent effect the one
"' See generally 11 AM. JuR., Constitutional Law §§ 53 to 55 (1957).
"N.C. CONST. art. 5, § 3 (1924).
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reflecting the most recent expression of the people's will should be held
to control. Thus, on balance, the stronger argument would hold that the
legislature has authority to exclude property from taxation in its dis-
cretion, but that once a class has been selected for taxation (i.e., included
in the tax base) the exemption section operates to exempt items in that
class owned by the state or municipal corporations and to limit the
General Assembly's power to exempt items in the taxed class to those
allowed by the exemption section.
DELEGATION OF POWERS TO EXEMPT AND TO CLASSIFY
Unless inhibited by the constitutional principle of uniformity, there
seems to be no reason why the General Assembly cannot exercise its
classification and exemption powers by special or local act as well as by
general law.75 As already indicated, it is also likely that, in addition
to its authority to grant exemption to property held for specified purposes
and in specified amounts, the courts would permit the General Assembly
to exercise its classification power in such a way as to exclude from
taxation any class of property it fails to tax. If the legislature has these
plenary powers and if it is free to exercise its powers by both general
and special laws, to what extent may it delegate the right to exercise its
exemption and classification powers to local units of government? For
example, rather than grant an exemption directly, may the General
Assembly delegate to a board of county commissioners authority to ex-
empt from taxation any property which the General Assembly itself has
constitutional authority to exempt? May it delegate to a board of county
commissioners authority to classify property for the purpose of setting
assessment ratios or rates of taxation for selected classes different from
those used for other classes? Or may the General Assembly delegate
to a board of county commissioners authority to exercise the classifica-
tion power in such a way as to reduce the local tax base through dis-
cretionary exclusions ?
In raising these questions it is understood that the taxing power is a
legislative power and that the power to classify and the power to exempt
are merely incidental, although important, segments of the power to tax.
It should also be understood that these issues cannot be settled without
first considering the extent of the General Assembly's general authority
to delegate the exercise of legislative power.
In North Carolina the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of
government are separate and distinct. 78 All legislative power is vested
" There seems to be no provision in the North Carolina Constitution limiting
the legislature's power to pass local and special acts with respect to tax matters
other than collection. See N.C. CoNsT. art. 2, §29 (1915). For a general con-
sideration of the problem, see Report of the Commission on Public-Local mid
Private Legislation, POPULAR GOVERNMENT, February-March, 1949.
"1 N.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8 (1868).
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in the General Assembly.7 7 It is commonly understood that delegation
of legislative power is frowned upon by the courts,78 but certain excep-
tions to the rule have been generally recognized. A recent North Caro-
lina case states one of these exceptions as follows: "Since legislation
must often be adapted to complex conditions involving numerous details
with which the legislature cannot deal directly, the constitutional in-
hibition against delegating legislative authority does not deny to the
legislature the necessary flexibility of enabling it to lay down policies and
establish standards, while leaving to designated governmental agencies
and administrative boards the determination of facts to which the policy
as declared by the legislature shall apply. .... ,,79 (Emphasis added.)
In this case it was made plain, however, that the Supreme Court was
unwilling to countenance delegation of legislative functions to a purely
administrative agency of the state if those functions were of something
more than a fact-finding nature.8 0 Would the court consider a county,
city, special district, or similar unit as something more than an adminis-
trative agency? This leads to an examination of a second exception to
the general rule against delegation of legislative power,8 1 stated by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in the following terms: "Legislative
power vests exclusively in the General Assembly . . . and, except as
authorized by the Constitution, as in the case of municipal corporations,
may not be delegated. ' '8 2 (Emphasis added.)
If the courts will recognize the General Assembly's right to delegate
certain legislative functions to municipal corporations it is apparent that
the term "municipal corporations" must be defined. Admittedly it
includes cities and towns. The clearest statement of the way the term
is used in the North Carolina Constitution was that given by the Supreme
Court in 1906. In the case up for decision the plaintiff claimed that an
act of the legislature setting up a local school district and conferring upon
its governing board the power to tax was invalid as an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority. In rejecting this contention Mr.
Justice Hoke wrote:
It is true that the power of taxation is an inherent and essential
attribute of sovereignty, which, under our system of government,
7Id. art. 2, § 1 (1868).
' Provision Company v. Daves, 190 N.C. 7, 128 S.E. 593 (1925).
Coastal Highway v. Turnpike Authority, 237 N.C. 52, 60-61, 74 S.E.2d. 310,
316 (1953).
. . . [W]hile the legislature may delegate the power to find facts or de-
termine the existence or nonexistence of a factual situation or condition on which
the operation of a law is made to depend ... it cannot vest in a subordifiate agency
the power to apply or withhold the application of the law in its absolute or un-
guided discretion." Id. at 60-61, 63, 74 S.E.2d at 316, 318.
81 The exception as commonly recognized is stated in 11 A7. JuR., Constitutional
Law § 224 (1957).
" Taylor v. Racing Ass'n, 241 N.C. 80, 95, 84 S.E.2d 390, 401 (1954).
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is placed in the legislative department, and that Mr. Cooley and
other writers on the subject, in referring to it, say that it cannot
be delegated except to municipal corporations. But in using the
term "municipal corporations" in this connection these writers do
not use the word in its restricted sense of municipal corporations
proper, confining it to cities and towns, but in a more enlarged
and generally received acceptation, which includes municipal
corporations technically so termed, and also public corporations
created by the State for the purposes of exercising defined and
limited governmental functions in certain designated portions of
the State's territory.
These last are termed by authors of approved excellence and
decisions of authority to be public quasi corporations, and are said
to include counties, townships, school districts, and the like.
8 3
In other words, the Supreme Court showed a willingness to recognize
a school district as enough of a municipal corporation to permit it to
levy its own taxes through action of its governing board. Counties,
school districts, and similar units exercise "defined and limited govern-
mental functions in certain designated portions of the State's territory,"
including the power to levy taxes for carrying out governmental responsi-
bilities within those local areas which are, in actuality, ultimate responsi-
bilities of the state itself.8 4  Thus, the decisions suggest it is proper to
equate counties and special taxing districts with cities and towns as
"municipal corporations" in the constitutional sense, and, as such, they
are capable of receiving and exercising delegated legislative powers of
taxation. In this connection, it may be reiterated that exemption and
classification are elements of the taxing power.
Thus, other constitutional principles aside-especially the uniformity
requirement-there appears to be no objection to legislation delegating
to the governing body of any political subdivision of the state authority:
1. To exempt from taxation any property the General Assembly
itself has authority to exempt.
2. To classify property for purposes of
a. Assessing it at a ratio lower than that used for other property
in the taxing unit.
"Smith v. School Trustees, 141 N.C. 143, 149-50, 53 S.E. 524, 526 (1906).
To the same effect, see Wells v. Housing Authority, 213 N.C. 744, 750, 197 S.E.
693, 697 (1938), and Coastal Highway v. Turnpike Authority, 237 NC. 5Z, 64, 74
S.E.2d 310, 319 (1953). These cases do not conflict with the theory of the nature of
counties expressed in Jones v. Commissioners, 137 N.C. 579, 596, 50 S.E. 291, 297(1905), Harrington & Co. v. Renner, 236 N.C. 321, 326, 72 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1952),
and Martin v. Commissioners of Wake, 208 N.C. 354, 365, 180 S.E. 777, 783 (1935).
" "The weight of authority is to the effect that all the powers and functions
of a county bear reference to the general policy of the state, and are in fact an
integral portion of the general administration of state policy." O'Berry v. Mecklen-
burg County, 198 N.C. 357, 360, 151 S.E. 880, 882 (1930), quoted with approval in
Martin v. Commissioners of Wake, 208 N.C. 354, 365, 180 S.E. 777, 783 (1935).
19591
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
b. Taxing it at a rate different from that imposed on other
property in the taxing unit.
3. To exercise the classification power in such a way as to exclude
classes of property from taxation at will.
Should the principle of uniformity enunciated by the constitution have
strength enough to defeat this delegation?
STATE POLICY
It has been explained that the constitutional requirement of uni-
formity in taxing property does not negate the legislature's right to grant
the exemptions enumerated in the constitution; that it does not prohibit
classification of property so as to have it assessed at a ratio of market
value different from that used in taxing other property; and that, if the
classification power is properly used, the uniformity rule probably does
not prohibit excluding from the tax base classes of property not exempti-
ble under the constitution. But the contexts in which these explanations
iiave been made have made it plain that such exercises of the taxing
power will meet the constitutional test of uniformity only so long as
they apply to designated classes of property within the taxing unit for
which the classifications have been made.
So long as the General Assembly limits its use of these powers to a
given taxing unit, or so long as a delegated exemption or classification
power is to be exercised within a given county, city, town, or special
district, the question of uniformity does not necessarily arise if the
individual unit is considered the taxing jurisdiction. And as long as North
Carolina imposes no state tax on property it may be considered academic
to ask if it is proper for the legislature-directly or through delegation-
to reduce or permit reduction of the tax base by these legitimate means
in selected political subdivisions without reducing it state-wide.
But the question is more than academic, for "Constitutions are sup-
posed to deal with future possibilities as well as present realities .... 0
As was said in 1934 in connection with the proposed draft of a new
constitution for North Carolina, "despite the present tendency to
leave the property tax as a tax to be levied only by local governments,
it cannot be said that the state has forever abandoned a property tax."' ,
Furthermore, as already suggested, even in the absence of a state tax
on property, there may be valid objections to property tax bases differing
from unit to unit. Hence, it becomes important to define the policy of
the state: Should the constitutional rule of uniformity apply only within
subdivisions of the state, or should it apply to the state as a geographic
and political unity?




It will be admitted at the outset that if the General Assembly should
permit the base against which some future state property tax might be
imposed to be reduced in some but not all geographic areas, any tax
levied on such a mutilated base would be invalid. It would not apply
uniformly to all the property in the class taxed.8 7 Once that point has
been made, however, the cases give little assistance. In the absence of
judicial views it is pertinent, although not necessarily helpful or con-
trolling, to consider any pattern disclosed by the acts of the General
Assembly and any opinions the North Carolina Attorneys General may
have expressed with respect to the issue.
The Statutory Pattern
Rather than catalogue each expression of the General Assembly's
views in this field, four statements will serve to summarize the attitude
toward uniformity discernible in the statutes:
Tax rates: The General Assembly has authorized counties, cities,
towns, and special districts to set their own tax rates. The constitution
limits the rate to be levied by counties for general governmental ex-
penses,8 and the legislature has provided a ceiling on the rate to be levied
by cities and towns for the same purpose.
89
Classification: The legislature has used its power to classify property
for the imposition of tax rates in only one major instance (by classifying
certain intangibles), but in at least one case it seems to have delegated
to counties the right to use that power.9 0 The General Assembly has
shown no inclination to exercise its classification power by setting assess-
ment ratios or standards for selected types of property, nor has it used
the power to exclude classes of property from the tax base unless its
selection of certain intangibles for taxation by the state be so interpreted.91
A, See 25 N.C.L. Rxv. 464-65 (1947).
88 N.C. GEx. STAT. § 153-9, par. 2 (Supp. 1957) authorizes counties to levy
for general purposes up to the 20¢ maximum set by N.C. CoNsT. art. 5, § 6 (1951).
89 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-56, -402 (Supp. 1957) authorize cities and towns to
levy up to $1.50 on the $100 of value of property for general governmental purposes.
0' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-294.1 (Supp. 1957), "agricultural products in storage."
" Under the North Carolina Constitution the General Assembly has complete
authority over the creation of counties, cities, and towns and over their rights
to impose taxes. This constitutional scheme can be interpreted in two ways,
either (1) that the state as a whole is the property tax jurisdiction, operating
through local subdivisions, or (2) that the state, counties, and municipalities-under
legislative action-are three separate and independent levels of government, each
with its own taxing power and property tax base. If the first interpretation is
accepted it can be said that the Machinery Act, taken in conjunction with the
Intangibles Tax, provides for taxing all property not specifically exempted, some
of it by the local units, some by the state. [This may be the significance of
Bragg Investment Co. v. Cumberland County, 245 N.C. 492, 96 S.E.2d 341 (1956).]
Looked at in this light, the General Assembly has, in practice, and with few
exceptions, adhered to the theory of a general property tax. On the other hand,
if the second view is accepted it can be argued that when the Intangibles Tax was
enacted the General Assembly used its classification power to exclude the selected
intangibles from the county and municipal tax bases and, at the same time, to
exclude from the state tax base all other forms of property.
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Exemption: Although the legislature has from time to time granted
exemption to classes and items of property (both on a state-wide and
local basis) not entitled to exemption under the constitution, it has not
delegated exemption powers to local units of government.92  It has
reserved to itself the right to exempt property from taxation.
Assessment: The General Assembly has established uniform state-
wide standards for use in assessing property for taxation 3 and has
established a system requiring annual assessment of property other than
real estate, while establishing a quadrennial system for real estate ;94
but it has granted both general and special legislative permission to
individual counties to defer or postpone reassessment of real property be-
yond stated quadrennial years.95 Responsibility for the work of as-
sessing property for taxation has been divided by the General Assembly
in three ways for administration at two levels of government:
1. To the State Board of Assessment (at the state level) the General
Assembly has assigned responsibility for assessing the total property-
worth of railroads and public service companies capable of exercising
the power of eminent domain.96 (This includes assessment of real
property and both tangible and intangible personalty.) The unitary
valuation is allocated among local units according to accepted formulae.97
(Counties, cities, and special districts apply their tax rates to the net
valuations thus allocated.)
2. To the Commissioner of Revenue, subject to review by the Tax
Review Board upon proper appeal, the General Assembly has assigned
responsibility for assessing intangibles classified under the intangibles
tax.98 (Uniform state-wide rates are imposed on such assessments,
and the net revenues received therefrom, under supervision of the State
Board of Assessment, are allocated among the political subdivisions of
the state by statutory formulae.) 99
3. To the counties, subject to supervision, review, and correction by
the State Board of Assessment (upon appeal or upon its own motion),
the General Assembly has assigned responsibility for assessing all real
property and all tangible and intangible personalty not assessed by the
Commissioner of Revenue or State Board of Assessment.100 (To the
9" LEwis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 24-5.
" Real and tangible personal property in general, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-294
(Supp. 1957) ; public service companies and railroads, Id. §§ 105-358, -365, -366;
classified intangibles, Id. §§ 105-199 to -205.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-278 to -280 (Supp. 1957).
See provisos added to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-278 (Supp. 1957).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-362 (Supp. 1957).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-360 (Supp. 1957) (utilities), § 105-365, -366, -370
(Supp. 1957) (railroads).
"N.C. GEN STAT. § 105-208 (Supp. 1957).
"N.C. GEar. STAT. § 105-213 (Supp. 1957).
110 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-275, -276, -283 to -293, -327 to -334 (Supp. 1957).
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value so determined, all local rates-county, city, town,101 and special
district-are applied. When the state imposed a tax on real and
tangible personal property its rates were applied to valuations determined
in the same manner.)
Conclusions: Reviewing this recital of the North Carolina property
tax statutory pattern certain factual conclusions emerge:
1. The General Assembly has shown no disposition to delegate the
power to exempt property from taxation, but in a number of instances
it has assumed authority to grant exemptions on a less than state-wide
basis, thereby suggesting that it assumes the constitution's uniformity
rule does not prohibit variations in the tax base from locality to locality
so long as uniformity is preserved within individual local taxing units.
2. The General Assembly has not felt that the uniformity rule pro-
hibits it from allowing local governmental units as well as the state to
set their own tax rates (within certain limits). Thus, there is no single
tax-levying jurisdiction for property tax purposes in North Carolina;
rather, the General Assembly has recognized four, each competent in its
own area under legislative enactments: the state, the county, the city
or town, and the special district.
3. The statutory pattern demonstrates that the General Assembly has
acted as if the uniformity principle requires assessment of property for
taxation to be administered on a uniform state-wide basis, presumably
to avoid accidental or intentional geographic variations in the tax base.
Thus, the statutes provide for only one assessment jurisdiction, and that
is state-wide. This is true both from the standpoint of ultimate authority
and from the standpoint of the statutory plan of administration; and it is
true despite the fact that, through administrative convenience and fi-
nancial necessity, the General Assembly has assigned to counties a large
segment of the assessment work. The assessments placed on property
by county authorities remain subject to review, revision, and equaliza-
tion by an agency of state-wide jurisdiction.
4. The inference to be drawn from these facts is that, with the
exception of certain acts granting local tax exemptions, the General
Assembly has adhered to a state-wide concept of uniformity in matters
concerned with the tax base, that is, with respect to the subjects of
taxation and their assessment. Unless the local exemptions are treated
as attempted classifications-and there is doubt they would be upheld
on that basis since they seem to be based solely on geographic location-
it can be said that the General Assembly has refrained from using the
classification power to exclude property from the tax base on a less than
.10 Cities and towns situated in more than one county may assess their own
property, and a few of the smaller ones do so. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-334 (Supp,
1957).
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state-wide basis. Furthermore, while taking into account the practical
effect of the two instances in which the legislature has allowed local units
to apply less than their full unit-wide rates to defined classes of proper-
ty,10 2 there is still substantial evidence that with regard to assessment
standards and ratios the General Assembly has been unwilling to sanction
systems under which the tax base might be altered in one political sub-
division without altering it state-wide. So much for the formal evidence
of legislative "intent," but it is impossible to say whether this has been
a reasoned interpretation of the constitutional principle of uniformity
or simply an intuitive application of "fair play," the principle Chief
Justice Stacy called "the main thesis of the Constitution."'"3
Views of the Attorneys General
At the same general election at which the classification amendment
was adopted the people approved an additional constitutional amendment
designed to authorize the General Assembly, in its discretion, "to exempt
from taxation not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) in value
of property held and used as the place of residence of the owner."'1 4 In
a practical as well as theoretical sense this amendment served to
establish within the constitution itself a classification of property to
which the General Assembly might accord exemption as it saw fit. The
Classification Amendment Commission, considering this homestead
amendment as well as the amendment named in its title, asked Attorney
General McMullan certain questions, among which were these: "Would
it be within the constitutional power of the General Assembly [under
the homestead exemption amendment] to . . . (c) provide different
levels of exemption in different counties? (d) leave the matter of
exemption optional with individual taxing units, to be acted upon as
financial conditions permit ?"105
In other words, the Attorney General was asked whether, in his
opinion, the General Assembly might exercise its discretionary home-
stead exemption power to reduce or permit the reduction of the tax base
on less than a state-wide basis. In reply the Attorney General wrote:
It is doubtful whether the suggestions concerning different
levels of exemption in different counties, whether by legislative
act or by home rule, would meet the requirements of the Constitu-
tion that "taxes on property shall be uniform as to each class of
property taxed." It strikes me that the class of property taxed
20-N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-294.1, -294.2 (Supp. 1957).
I'l Odd Fellows v. Swain, 217 N.C. 632, 637, 9 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1940).
'10 N.C. CONsT. art. 5, § 5 (1935).
10' Undated letter of the Attorney General of North Carolina to Henry Brandis,
printed as Appendix D, NORTH CAROLINA CLAssirIcATixON AMENDMENT CoMMIs-
SiON, REPORT 326, 332 (1938).
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is homesteads, and not homesteads in Wake County or any other
county.10 6 (Emphasis added.)
Here the Attorney General recognized that the classification had been
established by the constitution itself, and in such a situation he felt the
General Assembly, in using its own classification power, had no authority
to make sub-classifications on a geographic or political subdivision basis.
The opinion does not deal with the question of whether, in the absence
of a constitutional classification, the General Assembly might exercise its
classification power by establishing classes defined in terms of geographic
or political subdivisions.
In August, 1956, when the first Tax Study Commission was con-
sidering the taxation of intangible personal property it asked Attorney
General Rodman for his views on whether the General Assembly had
power to authorize counties, cities, and towns to exempt residents of
their communities from payment of the Intangibles Tax. In answer, the
Attorney General referred to the fact that the tax was by its terms levied
for the benefit of the state as well as for the political subdivisions of the
state, and said, "I do not think that it would be in the power of the
legislature to delegate to a local commurfity the power to exempt resi-
dents of that community from the payment of a tax levied by the state
on the residents of all other areas of the state."'" 7 He then added:
Aside from the question of the delegation of power to exempt
from taxation, Article V, Section 5 of our Constitution limits the
power of the legislature with respect to the exemption from prop-
erty taxation. Our Supreme Court, in several cases, has said
that the legislature can only exempt from taxation as authorized
by Section 5. Odd Fellows v. Swain, 217 N.C. 632; Hospital v.
Guilford County, 218 N.C. 677.
... When Sections 3 and 5 of Article V, of the Constitution
are read together, a serious question is presented as to whether
any kind of property may be freed of taxation when an ad valorem
tax is levied on other property. 0 8
The Attorney General's main point here seems to have been this: If a tax
is being imposed by the state, the state itself deriving revenue from it, the
constitutional rule of uniformity prevents the General Assembly from
granting or delegating the right to grant exemptions or exclusions from
that tax in terms of geographic or political subdivisions. He does not
touch on the situation in which the state levies no tax of its own.
In September, 1956, Attorney General Patton was asked, "Does the
General Assembly have the authority to enact statutes which permit
110 Id. at 333.
10o Letter of the Attorney General of North Carolina to Brandon P. Hodges,
August 8, 1956, in the possession of the North Carolina State Department of Tax
Research.108Ibid.
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local taxing authorities, in their discretion, to levy a tax upon intangible
personal property or to exempt such property entirely from taxation ?"
To this the Attorney General replied in the negative, calling attention
to the fact that, "The General Assembly has no authority to exempt
property from taxation beyond the permissive power granted to it by
Article V, Sec. 5, of the State Constitution," and stating that it was his
opinion that this constitutional provision made it clear (1) "that total
exemption of intangible personal property does not come within the
authorization" and (2) that "the General Assembly may not authorize
local taxing authorities, in their discretion, to exempt intangible personal
property from taxation."' 0 9
To summarize: The first opinion from the Attorney General's office
stands for the proposition that the General Assembly has no authority
to exercise its power to grant exemptions on less than a state-wide basis
either by direct legislation or by delegation to local authorities. In
other words, Attorney General McMullan was of the opinion that the
constitution does not permit the General Assembly to use its exemption
power to effect variations in the property tax base from local unit to
local unit.
The third opinion stands for the proposition that the constitutional
enumeration of permissible legislative exemptions is exclusive, and the
second opinion holds simply that local units of government cannot be
permitted, under the uniformity standard, to exempt their citizens from
a state-imposed property tax.
..9 Letter of the Attorney General of North Carolina to Brandon P. Hodges,
September 12, 1956, in the possession of the North Carolina State Department of
Tax Research. In support of his views the Attorney General cited two cases: (1)
Odd Fellows v. Swain, 217 N.C. 632, 9 S.E.2d 365 (1940), holding that a
commercial office building owned by a fraternal order was taxable despite the
fact that the lodge rooms occupied a small portion of the building. The opinion
contains language that is helpful in interpreting the exemption section of the
constitution: "The grant is limited in its terms, and the power to exempt stops
at the boundary of the grant." Id. at 638, 9 S.E.2d at 369. (2) Rockingham
County v. Elon College, 219 N.C. 342, 13 S.E.2d 618 (1941), holding that the
General Assembly has no authority to grant exemption to commercial real property
regardless of whether the net income therefrom is used exclusively for educational
purposes. In this case the Supreme Court called attention to the fact that the
authority granted in' the exemption section of the constitution, "is not that the
General Assembly may exempt property held by educational, scientific, literary,
charitable, or religious institutions, but the grant is in respect of property held for
one or more of the designated purposes .... It is the use of property other than
in private competitive business that justifies its exemption from taxation .... It
is difficult for the owners of other rental properties to understand why their
buildings should be taxed and the office building of their neighbor granted an
exemption. The Constitution declares that those in the same class shall be treated
alike. . . . The fact that a commercial enterprise devotes its entire profits to a
charitable or laudable purpose does not change the character of its business nor
the purpose for which it is held. It is still a commercial enterprise, and is held
as such .... So, when an educational institution sees fit to engage in an outside
competitive business for the purpose of increasing its revenues, the trade part of its




If it were permissible to draw inferences from the three opinions it
could be said that the three Attorneys General were inclined to take a
strict view of the exemption and uniformity provisions of the constitu-
tion and, had they been asked directly whether the legislature's power
to classify property carried with it the power to effect variations in the
property tax base on less than a state-wide basis, that they would have
answered in the negative. But the questions they considered were not
framed in terms of classification; they were framed in terms of exemption.
And although Attorney General Rodman came close to dealing with
the point, none of the opinions can be considered as a direct expression
of views on the basic issue under discussion here.
CONCLUSION
The Attorneys General have not actually been called on to deal with
the question of whether the uniformity principle would prevent less than
state-wide alteration of the tax base through use of the classification
power. Furthermore, while it is true that statutes are persuasive in
showing a legislative attitude or "intent" to deal with the property tax
base in state-wide terms, it must be admitted that the General Assembly
has not been entirely consistent in dealing with the problem, either by
exemption or classification. In addition, it can hardly be presumed that
members of the General Assembly have been unaware of the fact that
informally adopted assessment ratios have long worked to produce an
admittedly disuniform tax base from taxing jurisdiction to taxing juris-
diction within the state.
What this recital seems to mean is that there is more than a chance
that the Supreme Court would find it difficult to invoke the uniformity
rule on a state-wide basis in the absence of a state-wide property tax.
Hence, it must be recognized as being within the realm of legal possibility
that the General Assembly may be able to exercise or delegate the
exercise of its classification power-and possibly even its exemption
power-so as to reduce the tax base on a less than state-wide basis.
If such a conclusion should be reached by the Supreme Court certain
results would naturally follow:
1. Counties and possibly cities and towns would be free to compete
in granting tax concessions through rate and assessment differentials
as well as through exclusions and exemptions.
2. Individuals and business firms owning property in more than one
taxing jurisdiction would be forced to determine on a unit-by-unit basis
what property was exempt, excluded from the base, or taxed or assessed
at a reduced rate.
3. In making distribution of state funds to local units for services
financed jointly by the state and local governments it would be futile
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for the distributing agency to try to determine wealth, ability to pay,
or need on the basis of local assessment figures.
4. Should the state find it necessary to impose a state-wide tax on
locally assessed real and personal property great complications and ex-
pense would be incurred in establishing a uniform base against which
to apply the tax.
In this state of the law, North Carolina should consider writing into
its constitution provisions prohibiting the General Assembly from re-
ducing the property tax base on a less than state-wide basis, either
directly or by delegation. It was this objective that led the Commission
for the Study of the Revenue Structure of the State to propose the fol-
lowing working drafts for amendments to the North Carolina Constitu-
tion :110
ARTICLE V, SECTION 3. "STATE TAXATION."
Present wording:
The power of taxation shall be exercised in a just and equitable
manner, and shall never be surrendered, suspended or contracted
away. Taxes on property shall be uniform as to each class of
property taxed. Taxes shall be levied only for public purposes....
Proposed wording:
The power of taxation shall be exercised in a just and equitable
manner, for public purposes only, and shall never be surrendered,
suspended, or contracted away. Only the General Assembly shall
have power to classify property and other subjects for taxation,
which power shall be exercised only on a state-wide basis. No
class or subject shall be taxed except by uniform rule, and every
classification shall be uniformly applicable in every county, mu-
nicipality, and other local taxing unit of the State. The General
Assembly's power to classify shall not be delegated, except that
the General Assembly may permit the governing boards of cities
and towns to classify trades and professions for municipal license
tax purposes....
ARTICLE V, SECTION 5. "PROPERTY EXEMPT FROM TAXATION."
Present wording:
Property belonging to the State or to municipal corporations,
shall be exempt from taxation. The General Assembly may ex-
empt cemeteries and property held for educational, scientific,
literary, charitable or religious purposes; also wearing apparel,
arms for muster, household and kitchen furniture, the mechanical
and agricultural implements of mechanics and farmers, libraries,
and scientific instruments, or any other personal property, to a
value not exceeding three hundred dollars. The General Assembly
may exempt from taxation not exceeding one thousand dollars
($1,000) in value of property held and used as the place of
residence of the owner.10 TAX STuDy CommiSSI N OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, REPORT 37
(1958).
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Proposed wording:
Property belonging to the State, counties, and municipal
corporations, shall be exempt from taxation. The General As-
sembly may exempt cemeteries and property held for educational,
scientific, literary, charitable or religious purposes, and, to a
value not exceeding three hundred dollars, any personal property.
The General Assembly may exempt from taxation not exceeding
one thousand dollars in value of property held and used as the
place of residence of the owner. Every exemption shall be on a
state-wide basis and shall be uniformly applicable in every county,
municipality, and other local taxing unit of the State. No taxing
authority other than the General Assembly may grant exemptions,
and the General Assembly shall not delegate the powers accorded
to it by this section.
